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Lawyer Discipline and Professional
Standards in California:
Progress and Problems
By R. F. OUTCAULT, JR.*
and
GEORGE E. PETERSON**
LAWYERS have in recent years become the objects of increasing
criticism expressing dissatisfaction with professional standards1 and
ineffectual disciplinary procedures.' Similarly, the need for revision of
rules of conduct, particularly restrictions on advertising, has been ar-
gued in a steadily growing number of legal publications.'
The organized bar has generally been responsive to these and to a
host of other demands when adequate resources to effect reform have
been available and when the reform proposal fairly reflects commonly
accepted attitudes of the lawyer membership. Thus, proposals for
more efficient disposition of disciplinary matters or for higher stand-
ards of professional competency are consistent with a generally ac-
cepted attitude that the privilege of self-discipline and the power to set
professional standards create a responsibility to meet public expecta-
tions in these areas. On the other hand, pressures for revision of the
restrictions on advertising illustrate a basic disagreement concerning
the proper role of the bar as a vehicle for social reform and the ac-
* A.B., Stanford University, 1947; LL.B., Stanford University, 1950; Mem-
ber, California Bar; California State Bar Disciplinary Board, member, 1969-1971 and
chairman, 1971. Currently Chairman of the California State Bar Client Security Fund.
** B.A., Loyola University, 1969; J.D., Loyola University, 1972; member, Cali-
fornia Bar.
1. Burger, A Sick Profession?, 5 TULSA L.J. 1 (1968).
2. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITrEE ON EVALUATION OF DiscI-
PLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCE-
MENT 1970 (Final Draft) [hereinafter cited as CLARK REPORT].
3. See note 137 infra.
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ceptable degree of restrictions which the bar may impose on the free-
dom of action of its members.
The California State Bar has made remarkable progress in the de-
velopment of its disciplinary structure. Two recent examples of re-
form illustrate this: the processing of complaints against attorneys has
been greatly expedited by delegation of chief authority in this area to
the Disciplinary Board and by enlargement of the full-time investiga-
tive and professional staff; and the State Bar's Client Security Fund,
effective for over a year, now provides statewide protection in the
event of misappropriation of clients' funds.
The profession is rapidly moving toward parallel reforms in other
areas. The state bar is at a point of decision regarding the issue of
professional incompetency as a disciplinable offense. Pressures from
within the profession and from the media may prompt a similar re-ex-
amination of the rules prohibiting indirect advertising. In all of these
areas, it is timely to examine the approach currently taken in California
and to ascertain future directions.
Disciplinary Structure and Proceedings
The well-noted conclusions of the Clark Report4 on the present
status of disciplinary enforcement have prompted a general re-exami-
nation by state bars of methods of lawyer discipline. Because of its
large membership, the State Bar of California has had to make con-
tinuous efforts to keep abreast of the disciplinary problem. The struc-
ture and methods developed over a long period of years have enabled
the state bar to compare itself favorably with the recommendations of
the Clark Report, to the point where California may well have pro-
vided an example of the quintessential disciplinary structure com-
mended to other states. The function of the state bar in disciplinary
proceedings is ancillary to the authority of the California Supreme
Court, which has original jurisdiction in disciplinary matters.5 The
bar is not itself vested with judicial power,6 nor does it operate as an
administrative board in the normal sense. It is sui generis,7 em-
4. CLARK REPORT, supra note 2.
5. Brotsky v. State Bar, 57 Cal. 2d 287, 301, 368 P.2d 697, 704, 19 Cal.
Rptr. 153, 160 (1962).
6. In re Richardson, 209 Cal. 492, 498, 288 P. 669, 671 (1930).
7. Brotsky v. State Bar, 57 Cal. 2d 287, 300, 368 P.2d 697, 703, 19 Cal. Rptr.
153, 159 (1962); Fish v. State Bar, 214 Cal. 215, 4 P.2d 937 (1931). "Although it
has been held that an accusation is in the nature of a criminal charge ...and that a
proceeding on such a charge is a quasi-criminal action . .. this court has uniformly
treated disbarment proceedings as peculiar to themselves, and governed exclu-
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powered by the State Bar Act to provide a "complete alternative and
cumulative method" in disciplinary affairs," while operating as an
arm of the court and subject to supreme court review in all its ac-
tions.9
Disciplinary proceedings follow three major stages. The first
stage involves investigation, hearing and recommendation of findings
and discipline by local administrative committees. This is followed by
a determination by the Disciplinary Board of the issues of guilt and
extent of discipline. Finally, the supreme court may order disbarment
or suspension or, upon request, review lesser penalties of reproval im-
posed by the Disciplinary Board. The same legislation clothing the
state bar with disciplinary power over attorneys also authorizes the
Board of Governors to formulate substantive and procedural rules for
the disciplinary process.' 0 Upon approval by the supreme court, the
Rules of Professional Conduct thus promulgated become binding upon
all members of the California bar.
Disciplinary proceedings against members of the state bar may be
instituted by the supreme court" or, more commonly, by invoking the
disciplinary machinery of the state bar.'" The authority of the court to
disbar or suspend attorneys is inherent in its disciplinary power over
the conduct of officers of the court13 and may not be delegated by the
state legislature to other boards.1 4  By enactment of the State Bar
Act,'" the legislature provided "a complete alternative and cumulative
method" of discipline in addition to that exercised by the court.' 6
sively by the Code sections specifically covering them." Id. at 222, 4 P.2d at 940.
See also Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 288 (1882).
8. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6075, 6087 (West 1962).
9. Brotsky v. State Bar, 57 Cal. 2d 287, 301, 368 P.2d 697, 704, 19 Cal. Rptr.
153, 160 (1962); Herron v. State Bar, 212 Cal. 196, 199, 298 P. 474, 475 (1931).
10. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6076-77 (West 1962). See Rules of Professional
Conduct of the State Bar of California, id. foil. § 6076; Rules of Procedure of the State
Bar of California, id. foil. § 6087.
11. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6100-17 (West 1962).
12. Id. §§ 6075-87.
13. Barton v- State Bar, 209 Cal. 677, 680-81, 289 P. 818, 819 (1930). See
generally, CLARK REPORT, supra note 2, 10-18, discussing the inherent power of courts
to discipline members of the bar and recommending that any legislative interference be
struck down by the courts.
14. See Barton v. State Bar, 209 Cal. 677 (1930). See also In re Shattuck, 208
Cal. 6, 279 P. 998 (1929); Matter of Application of Riccardi, 64 Cal. App. 791, 222
P. 625 (1923). This inherent authority has been made statutory: CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE §§ 6100-17 (West 1962).
15. Cal. Stat. 1939, ch. 34, at 347, codified at CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6000-
172 (West 1962, Supp. 1972).
16. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6075 (West 1962). The legislative authoriza-
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The Board of Governors, acting through the Disciplinary Board17 and
local administrative committees,'" is authorized to receive complaints
or to initiate its own investigation concerning attorney misconduct.
As stated in the code, the nature of such misconduct may be
"wilful breach" of the Rules of Professional Conduct 9 or any cause set
forth in the state laws which would warrant disbarment, suspension or
other discipline.20 In cases involving the former violations, the statutes
empower the board to issue public or private reprovals to the attor-
ney involved or to recommend to the supreme court that he be sus-
pended from practice for up to three years. 21  In proceedings involv-
ing the latter variety of offense, the board may recommend disbarment
or suspension, or may reprove the attorney publicly or privately with-
out such recommendation.22
Proceedings under the auspices of the state bar, whether initiated
by complaint 23 or by a bar-instituted investigation, 24 commence with
tion of the board to act in disciplinary matters is not to be construed as limiting or al-
tering the power of the supreme court in this area. Id. § 6087.
17. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6086.5 (West Supp. 1972), authorizing the
board to establish one or more "disciplinary boards" to act in its stead.
18. Id. §§ 6040-53 (West 1962).
19. Id. § 6077.
20. Id. § 6078.
21. Id. § 6077. Reprovals by the board are subject to review by the supreme
court on petition of the person complained against. Id. §§ 6082, 6083(b). Decisions
of the board recommending suspension, like those recommending disbarment, are im-
mediately filed with the clerk of the supreme court, accompanied by findings of fact
and a transcript of the evidence and proceedings. Id. §§ 6080, 6081. See Brotsky v.
State Bar, 57 Cal. 2d 287, 304, 368 P.2d 697, 706, 19 Cal. Rptr. 153, 162 (1962).
22. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6078 (West 1962).
23. Id. § 6043 (West Supp. 1972). The complaint may be in any form, written
or oral, formal or informal, verified or unverifieid. Rule 21, Rules of Procedure. See
Herron v. State Bar, 212 Cal. 196, 298 P. 474 (1931). "The law does not define
the characteristics or contents of any such complaint. The use of the word 'complaint'
is made without qualification. It is not even required to be in writing." Id. at 199,
298 P. at 475; accord, Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. 2d 548, 567, 354
P.2d 637, 646, 7 Cal. Rptr. 109, 118 (1960).
Nevertheless, the local administrative committee has discretion to require the com-
plainant to file a verified complaint, stating specifically the charges and facts support-
ing the complaint. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6042 (West Supp. 1972). See id. foll.
§ 6087, Rules 21-21(b) (West 1962).
24. "Information leading to a State Bar Investigation is derived from many
sources, such as news accounts, court decisions, and general information submitted by
persons not making complaints." BOARD OF GOVERNORS, THE STATE BAR OF CALI-
FORNIA, GUmES TO STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES 14 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as GUIDES TO DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES].
Statutory authorization for such investigations is found in CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 6044 (West 1962).
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a preliminary investigation. 25  The preliminary hearing is conducted
informally by an investigating committee.2  The conclusion may be
that there are insufficient facts to warrant further proceedings, 27 or
a notice to show cause may be issued and formal disciplinary pro-
ceedings instituted.2"
Service of the notice to show cause institutes the formal adversary
proceeding, informing the attorney that he is to appear before a trial
committee at a specified time and date and stating the charge against
him.29  The trial committee is a local administrative committee, apart
25. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foil. § 6087, Rule 21 (West 1962). The com-
mittee may conduct a "pre-preliminary" investigation to determine whether it should
proceed to a full preliminary hearing. "Pre-preliminary" investigations often fea-
ture a request by the committee that the attorney submit an explanation by letter re-
ply. The request form is known as a "Rule 21" letter. GUIDEs TO DISCIPLINARY PRO-
CEDuRE, supra note 24, at 15.
26. "In preliminary investigations the proceedings shall be informal, but thorough
with the object of ascertaining the truth." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foil. § 6087,
Rule 21 (West 1962). The investigating committee has considerable discretion in the
manner of conducting the hearing. Rules of legal evidence are not binding at this
point, since the attorney is not yet an adversary party. Hearsay statements may be
accepted, especially on nonvital issues, and witnesses usually are not placed under
oath. "At this stage, the investigation is one to determine probable cause by informal
methods. In some cases, the entire questioning may be by the committee, with ques-
tions suggested to it by the attorney and the examiner. In other cases, as where there
is an examiner for the State Bar, the facts may be elicited by direct questioning of the
witness or witnesses." GUIDES TO DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES, supra note 24, at 20.
The attorney is entitled to request and obtain, prior to the hearing, notice of the
nature of the charges. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foil. § 6087, Rule 8 (West 1962). He
is entitled to be represented by counsel, to have process issue, present evidence and
witnesses and to cross-examine. Id. § 6085.
For due process requirements in state bar procedures generally see In re Ruffalo,
390 U.S. 544 (1968); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
27. A determination of "N.S.F." (not sufficient facts) would be made where
the charges are unfounded or frivolous. GUIDES TO DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURE, supra
note 24, at 7. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE foll. § 6087, Rules 21, 21(a) (West 1962).
The board may receive requests for further investigation when filed within three months
of the mailing of notice of summary termination of proceedings. Id. Rule 20.
28. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foll. § 6087, Rule 21 (West 1962).
"In effect, a 'dismissal' or, more properly, declination to issue a Notice to Show
Cause, is a finding of lack of probable cause of issuance of a Notice. .. upon the facts
then before the preliminary committee.
"Such action may be generally likened to action of a grand jury in refusing to
indict or to that of a prosecuting officer in declining to issue a criminal charge on the
basis of the facts or evidence then presented." GInDES TO DISCIPLINARY PROCE-
DURES, supra note 24, at 30.
29. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6085, Rule 25 (West 1962). See Herron v.
State Bar, 212 Cal. 196, 201, 298 P. 474, 475-76 (1931); Werner v. Hearst Publica-
tions, Inc., 65 Cal. App. 2d 667, 670-71, 151 P.2d 308, 310-11 (1944). For discussion
as to .ontents and form of the notice, see GUIDES TO DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES, supra
note 24, at 33-42.
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from the investigating committee, and is responsible for receiving evi-
dence and making findings of fact as well as recommendations to the
Disciplinary Board as to dismissal or penalty. 0
The Rules of Procedure give the Disciplinary Board great flexi-
bility in acting on the report and recommendations submitted to it.
Upon consent of the attorney, the board may accept the findings made
by the trial committee and conclude that the findings warrant a pun-
ishment the same as or less severe than that recommended. 1 With
the attorney's consent, the matter may also be referred back to the
trial committee for a further recommendation on discipline, or placed
on the board's calendar for argument solely on the issue of the measure
of discipline.3 2  Or, again upon consent of the attorney, the board may
adopt findings of fact other than those made by the committee and
impose a more severe penalty. 3 The board may also take additional
evidence or set aside the committee report and hear the case de novo.3
As noted above, the board may decide without the attorney's consent
and in the regular course of procedure either to reprove the attorney,
subject to supreme court review, or to recommend to the supreme court
that the attorney be disbarred or suspended. 5
Disciplinary procedures following conviction in the criminal courts
follow a different pattern than that outlined above.36  Under section
6101 of the Business and Professions Code, the conviction of an attorney
for either felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude is cause for
disbarment or suspension. 7  The clerk of the court in which an attorney
30. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6043, 6048-53 (West 1962, Supp. 1972). See
also id. foil. § 6087, Rule 11 (trial hearings conducted by a committee different from
the investigating committee), Rule 14 (provisions for discovery), Rule 28 (pleading),
Rule 29 (legal evidence only may be received at the hearing), Rules 32-33 (the an-
swer), Rule 35 (transcript is prepared only when the committee recommends disbar-
ment or suspension).
"The State Bar Rules do not expressly permit alternative and inconsistent plead-
ing. However, the practice is well established and entirely proper." GUIDES TO Dis-
CIPLINARY PROCEDURES, supra note 24, at 54.
31. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foil. § 6087, Rule 38.5 (West Supp. 1972).
"At this stage, further proceedings in the case are usually based on the record as
made before the trial committee. Study of the record, including exhibits, therefore is
important. If a transcript exists it, of course, should be the basis of the study. Other-
wise, reliance must be placed on notes or recollection of the substance of the testimony
and exhibits." GUIDES TO DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES, supra note 24, at 97.
32. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foll. § 6087, Rule 38.5 (West Supp. 1972).
33. GUIDES TO DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES, supra note 24, at 97-98.
34. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foll. § 6087, Rule 39.1 (West Supp. 1972).
35. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE 88 6078, 6083 (West 1962).
36. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6101-02 (West 1962).
37. Id. § 6101.
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is convicted or the state bar forwards a certified copy of the record of
conviction to the supreme court when the nature of the offense or the
circumstances surrounding the act appear to involve moral turpitude."8
If the record clearly shows moral turpitude or if there is probable cause
to believe such was involved, an interim order of suspension by the
supreme court is automatic.39  Once conviction is final,40 and after af-
fording the attorney an opportunity to be heard, the court may con-
clude that the crime or its surrounding circumstances involved moral
turpitude, thereafter entering an order of disbarment or suspension
according to the gravity of the offense. 1 At either the stage when the
conviction is final, or prior to the interim suspension order, the court
may refer issues to the state bar for hearing and recommendatiorns.42
The Board of Governors in turn assigns the case to a hearing commit-
tee, the procedures being generally the same as described above for
nonconviction disciplinary matters.
43
Although not clearly stated in the Code or in the Rules of Pro-
cedure, the authority of the state bar to discipline its members permits
the bar to initiate proceedings when the supreme court is powerless to
disbar. The court has recognized, for example, that while the statutes
prevent it from disbarring for convictions involving moral turpitude
until conviction is final, the state bar is not thus limited. The fact
that the matter is pending before the court does not deprive the bar of
jurisdiction to institute original proceedings concerning the same con-
duct as was the basis for the conviction.44 The bar may then recom-
mend to the court that the attorney be disbarred on the basis of his
38. Id. The delineation of which crimes involved moral turpitude is an admittedly
difficult task. The outer boundaries are established as between such crimes as mur-
der, embezzlement or extortion on the one hand, and convictions of violations of police
regulations or simple assault and battery on the other. In re Hatch, 10 Cal. 2d 147,
150, 73 P.2d 885, 886 (1937). Moral turpitude is also present in offenses involving
an intent to defraud, and "the related group of offenses involving intentional dis-
honesty for purposes of personal gain ...... In re Hallinan, 43 Cal. 2d 243, 248-49,
272 P.2d 768, 771 (1954). In doubtful cases the determination depends on the cir-
cumstances of each particular case. In re Hatch, supra.
39. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6102(a) (West 1962).
40. Id. § 6102(a), (b). Subdivision (b) provides that an order suspending im-
position of sentence pending probation is, nonetheless, a final conviction, even though it
may be ultimately dismissed upon fulfillment of probation. See CAL. PEN. CODE §
1203.4 (West Supp. 1972).
41. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6102(b) (West 1962).
42. Id. § 6102(c).
43. See id. foil. § 6087, Rules 60-78.
44. In re Phillips, 17 Cal. 2d 55, 58, 109 P.2d 344, 346 (1941) (dictum); In re
Hatch, 10 Cal. 2d 147, 151, 73 P.2d 885, 887 (1937) (dictum).
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conduct, apart from the fact of conviction.4 5
It is clear that conviction is not a condition precedent to discipli-
nary measures. 46  Thus dismissal or acquittal of criminal charges has
no res judicata effect upon the identical issues when brought before the
bar.4 7  Similarly, it would seem that where pursuant to a referral by
the supreme court the bar finds no moral turpitude involved in an at-
torney's criminal conviction, the bar may yet prosecute on the basis of
some wilful breach of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Recent Procedural Reforms
In order to make the enforcement structure perform more efficiently,
the state bar instituted several reforms in the manner in which complaints
are handled and records are maintained. 48  More significantly, the
number of paid, full-time investigators and hearing examiners has dou-
bled,4 9 and the possibility of employing a staff large enough to elimi-
nate use of volunteers is being studied. 0  This last improvement
would not only eliminate many delays but would also permit more
thorough and expert investigations."' The state bar has considered
the area of disciplinary enforcement to be vital to the proper carrying
out of its responsibilities to the public, and has allocated from state bar
funds approximately $637,000 annually for these purposes.
52
An equally important improvement was made in the transfer of
review functions from the Board of Governors to the Disciplinary
45. In re Phillips, 17 Cal. 2d 55, 109 P.2d 344 (1941) (dictum). "Where the
trial court suspends the rendition of its judgment, this court . . . can only suspend and
cannot disbar the attorney, for there has been no final adjudication of his guilt ....
In such a case, if it is thought that the attorney has been guilty of conduct warranting
disbarment, it is incumbent upon the State Bar to proceed upon its own initiative un-
der article 5 of the State Bar Act. Following the disciplinary procedure therein provided,
a recommendation can be made upon which this court may then make an order of dis-
barment." Id. at 58, 109 P.2d at 346 (dictum).
46. Best v. State Bar, 57 Cal. 2d 633, 371 P.2d 325, 21 Cal. Rptr. 589 (1962);
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6106 (West 1962).
47. Res judicata is not applicable because of the different prosecuting parties,
and a different purpose of protecting the public rather than punishing. See Yapp v.
State Bar, 62 Cal. 2d 809, 402 P.2d 361, 44 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1965).
48. See Metropolitan News, August 15, 1972, at 7.
49. Id.
50. THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA, THE STATE BAR IN THE SEVENTIES 3-5
(1971) [hereinafter cited as CALIFORNIA STATE BAR REPORT].
51. But cf. Kane, Lawyer Discipline in Florida, 44 FLA. B.J. 522 (1970).
52. Metropolitan News, August 15, 1972, at 7. Projected cost of discipline for
1980 is almost $1 million annually, which is paid solely by the state bar without
legislative assistance. CALIFORNIA STATE BAR REPORT, supra note 50, at 4.
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Board.53  This shift was deemed necessary because of the steadily in-
creasing volume of disciplinary matters requiring consideration54 and
the need for a committee which could devote substantially all of its
time to developing special expertise in this area.
The Disciplinary Board consists of fifteen members appointed by
the Board of Governors. 5 The board members serve terms of three
years, without compensation. In addition to their duties as review
board in all cases arising out of formal proceedings before local ad-
ministrative committees,56 the members are also called upon to per-
form discipline-related functions. In this latter category, the Discipli-
nary Board supervises all disbursements from the State Bar Client Se-
curity Fund, 7 recommends improvements in the Rules of Procedure,
and compiles special reports and recommendations on disciplinary re-
form which are submitted to the Board of Governors. s
This centralized disciplinary structure is well-suited to Califor-
nia's large lawyer population, and, indeed, a similar handling of com-
plaints has been recommended by the American Bar Association as a
model for other states.59 The system permits complaints to be re-
ceived with minimum requirements as to formality, but is not depen-
dent upon complaints before launching its own investigations. The
mechanics of lawyer discipline are sufficiently independent from local
control so as to mitigate the danger of lax enforcement where close
personal relationships exist. Unnecessary duplication of effort in the
investigatory and hearing stages has been avoided, while proper atten-
tion has been accorded to due process requirements. Further, uniform
discipline has been enforced throughout the state. But perhaps the
most important benefit is that the state bar has been able to regulate it-
self adequately, thus relieving the courts of that burden.
53. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6086.5, foil. § 6087, Rules 80-89 (West Supp.
1972).
54. In the past five years the number of cases reviewed by the Disciplinary Board
has increased by 50 percent. Similarly, the number of formal hearings increased by
30 percent over the same period, and preliminary investigations increased by 75 per-
cent. Metropolitan News, August 15, 1972, at 7.
55. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foil. § 6087, Rule 81(a), (b) (West Supp. 1972).
56. Id. Rule 83.
57. See text accompanying notes 86-91 infra.
58. "The board of governors by specific action may delegate additional au-
thority to and impose other functions upon the disciplinary board." CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE foil. § 6087, Rule 84 (West Supp. 1972).
59. CLARK REPORT, supra note 2, at xiv-xv. See also Murphy, A Short History
of Disciplinary Procedures in Illinois, 60 ILL. B.J. 528 (1972); Roberts, Pennsylvania's
Disciplinary Procedures for the Bar, 39 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 490 (1968); Note Discipli-
nary Enforcement Problems and Recommendations: An Indiana Survey, 46 IND. L.J.
134 (1970).
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All of this has not brought the state bar to the point where it can
regard its responsibility to the public as discharged. As noted by a
former president of the state bar, disciplinary enforcement is a task re-
quiring the constant dedication of the bar's membership and continuing
improvement.60 Nevertheless, it is also necessary that the public be
made aware of the solid accomplishments which have been made in
this field, and of the state bar's concern that more progress be forth-
coming.
Client Security Fund
The misappropriation of clients' funds by attorneys is, fortunately,
a relatively infrequent abuse of the lawyer's fiduciary position.6 ' The
public reaction to such defalcations as occur, however, is not propor-
tionate to the frequency of this misconduct.6 2  Since the bar has been
entrusted with devising and enforcing disciplinary measures and is
charged with maintaining high standards of professionalism among its
own ranks, it is not surprising that thefts of clients' monies by individ-
ual lawyers should cast opprobrium upon the entire profession.
60. Plant, The Disciplinary Problem: A Call for Individual Dedication, 46 CAL.
ST. B.J. 130 (1971).
61. Between 1967 and 1969 the Disciplinary Board imposed or recommended dis-
cipline to the supreme court in thirty-seven cases involving misappropriation of funds
belonging to forty-nine clients. Full or partial restitution was made to nineteen clients
by the attorney involved or his partner. During the same period, an additional 14
lawyers resigned in Los Angeles and San Francisco Counties alone while disciplinary
proceedings regarding misappropriation of funds were pending. It should be noted that
50 percent of the resignations were in Los Angeles County where the bulk of disciplinary
matters arise. State Bar Survey, 1969-70, on file at the California State Bar Ass'n.
These figures should be contrasted with a current bar membership of 36,000, increased
from 27,500 in 1967; complaints received annually currently total 3,707, increased from
2,497 in 1967; preliminary investigations annually total 1,213, increased from 686 in
1967. Metropolitan News, August 15, 1972, at 7. See also Hunter, The Clients' Se-
curity Fund-What Shall We Do About It?, 38 J.B. Ass'N OF KAN. 23, 25 (1969) [here-
inafter cited as Hunter].
62. See Hunter, supra note 61, at 25. "Rightly or wrongly, the image of the
lawyer in the public mind is not a creditable one. Each instance of defalcation by a
lawyer does immeasurable harm to the whole profession, no matter how gently it is
treated by the press. The fact that a lawyer is accused or found guilty of stealing his
client's money is news, and, unfortunately, bad news for the profession." Sterling,
A Client's Security Fund, 36 CAL. ST. B.J. 957, 958 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Sterling].
Embezzlement of clients' funds has, no doubt, added to the now legendary image of
the legal profession as an institution harboring both greatness and base dishonesty.
See, e.g., Hogan, Notes on Legal Ethics, 2 HASTINGS L.J. 81 (1951), quoting the in-
scription upon the tombstone of St. Ives: "St. Ives was a native of Brittany, a lawyer
but not a thief, which was a source of great wonder to the people." Id. at 82.
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Rule 9 of the Rules of Professional Conduct63 provides a basis
for disciplinary action in the event that an attorney commingles his
clients' funds with his own, regardless of whether the clients' money is
preserved or is actually dissipated.64 In the absence of any mandatory
auditing,65 however, this method supplies only limited protection for
the client against negligent misallocation of funds and none at all
against deliberate misappropriation. The bar's disciplinary authority
is usually invoked only after the fact, when the client has already been
harmed. Disbarment or suspension of the offending attorney at that
point is insufficient to fully restore public confidence in the bar.66
Indeed, Rule 9 is not only grossly inadequate from the standpoint of
safeguarding clients' funds, but may actually lull clients into a false
sense of security by prescribing use of the term "trust funds account."6
Evolution of the Security Fund
Recently, after long study by the state bar,68 greater protection
was made available by implementation of a client security fund. 9
Although a similar fund was administered on a limited basis by the
63. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE fol. § 6076 (West 1962). Rule 9 provides: "A
member of the State Bar shall not commingle the money or the property of a client with
his own; and he shall promptly report to the client the receipt by him of all money
belong to such client. Unless the client otherwise directs in writing, he shall promptly
deposit his client's funds in a bank or trust company . . . in a bank account separate
from his own account and clearly designated as 'Clients' Funds Account' or 'Trust Funds
Account,' or words of similar import."
64. See, e.g., Black v. State Bar, 7 Cal. 3d 676, 499 P.2d 968, 103 Cal. Rptr.
288 (1972); Crook v. State Bar, 3 Cal. 3d 346, 475 P.2d 872, 90 Cal. Rptr. 600
(1970); Cutler v. State Bar, 71 Cal. 2d 241, 455 P.2d 108, 78 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1969);
Zitney v. State Bar, 64 Cal. 2d 787, 415 P.2d 521, 51 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1966).
65. See CLARK REPORT, supra note 2, at 172-74. The report recommends a court
rule requiring attorneys to maintain records pertaining to client funds, and that such
records be audited annually. However, the report also noted that, while such audits
may aid in preventing misappropriation of funds, they are not the total solution.
66. See generally Smith, The Clients' Security Fund: "A Debt of Honor Owed
by the Profession," 44 A.B.AJ. 125, 128 (1958); Special Committee on Clients' Se-
curity Fund, Report, 84 A.B.A. REP. 604 (1959); Sterling, supra note 62, at 958.
67. "To a layman untrained in legal analysis the name, trust funds account,
may suggest some outside control and responsibility over the account; some periodic
audit of the account; and some fiduciary in the background to make good on embezzle-
ments and defaults." Blackman v. Hale, 78 Cal. Rptr. 569, 580 (1969), rev'd on other
grounds, 1 Cal. 3d 548, 463 P.2d 418, 83 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1970).
68. See, e.g., McKnight, Clients' Security Fund, 36 CAL. Sr. B.I 963 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as McKnight]; Sterling, supra note 62.
69. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6140.5 (West Supp. 1972). Conditions of re-
imbursement and other procedures are stated in the Rules of Procedure, Id. foil, § 6087,
Rules 102-21,
March 19731 1AWYEIR DISCIPLINE
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
Los Angeles County Bar Association since 1963,70 California was a
relative latecomer in the establishment of a state-wide plan. Since
1958, thirty-three other state bars have put security funds in operation,
as have twenty-one local bar associations."
In California, as in other states, the initial proposal was not re-
ceived without opposition. While agreeing that the public is entitled
to expect honesty and integrity in the legal profession, the critics of
the fund argued that this did not create an obligation on the part of
the bar to make pecuniary restitution for every miscreant member.72
To provide such a fund would, it was argued, only serve to publicize
the dishonesty of some lawyers, and would be received as a public con-
fession that the profession was so corrupt that it had to insure the pub-
lic against the dishonesty of its members. 71 Other objections were
also studied by the state bar, among them that the small number of em-
bezzlements perpetrated each year by lawyers did not warrant a remedy
of this magnitude and cost;74 that the plan was socialistic; 75 and that
attorneys would be encouraged to be lax in their dealings with clients'
funds, knowing that any loss would be made up by the security fund.76
It was also argued that once restitution was made from the security
70. The security fund currently sponsored by the Los Angeles County Bar Asso-
ciation provides $10,000 total compensation for clients of member attorneys only; re-
covery for any single client is limited to $5,000. Interview with Donald Hegler, Los
Angeles Bar Association, April 5, 1973.
Until recently, a similar fund was maintained by the San Diego County Bar Asso-
ciation. In January 1973, this fund was abolished in light of the broader coverage
available from the state bar. Interview with Julie Hegg, San Diego County Bar Asso-
ciation, April 5, 1973.
71. Standing Committee on Clients' Security Fund, Report, 96 A.B.A. REP.
595 (1971). See generally, Bryan, Clients' Security Fund Ten Years Later, 55
A.B.A.J. 757 (1969); Voorhees, Clients' Security Fund in 1961: A Progress Report, 47
A.B.A.J. 494 (1961); Note, The Disenchanted Client v. The Dishonest Lawyer: Where
Does the Legal Profession Stand?, 42 NOTRE DAME LAW. 382, 399 (1967).
The constitutionality of a security fund has rarely been questioned. In In the
Matter of a Member of the Bar, 257 A.2d 382 (Del. 1969), the Delaware Supreme
Court found the establishment of a security fund to be within the inherent power of
the court to sustain the standards of the bar. The basic constitutionality of the Cali-
fornia security fund has not been challenged. Cf. Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820,
881 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See generally Hersh v. State Bar, 7 Cal. 3d 241,
496 P.2d 201, 101 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1972) (holding assessment of increased fees for
security fund was premature); Slaughter v. Edwards, 11 Cal. App. 3d 285, 90 Cal. Rptr.
144 (1970).
72. McKnight, supra note 68. See Hunter, supra note 61, for a brief outline of
the major arguments against the security fund and a rebuttal.
73. Hunter, supra note 61, at 66; McKnight, supra note 68, at 964.
74. Hunter, supra note 61, at 25; Sterling, supra note 62, at 959-60.
75. Smith, supra note 66; Sterling, supra note 62, at 960.
76. Hunter, supra note 61, at 26.
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fund the bar would feel less compelled to seek disciplinary action
against the guilty lawyer. Finally, opposition to the plan cited the
necessarily limited compensation which the fund would be able to pay,
and pointed out that the disappointment engendered by the inability of
the bar to fully compensate claims would outweigh any benefits gained
in the area of public relations.77
Some of these latter points were cogent and the security fund was
designed accordingly to avoid these foreseeable weaknesses. 78  The
other arguments were regarded as less compelling. Proponents of the se-
curity fund contended that since the people had trusted the bar to govern
itself, subject only to supervision by the supreme court, and, as the
profession held out its members as deserving of the confidence placed
in them by clients, a moral obligation or "debt of honor" was created
to guarantee that public trust.79 Since the dishonest conduct of a few
lawyers would inevitably gain publicity, it was incumbent upon the ma-
jority to take measures which would aid in restoring the public's confi-
dence. To insure funds entrusted to lawyers would no more confess a
prevalence of corruption among lawyers generally than did the adop-
tion of federal depositor's insurance reflect ill upon the banking corpo-
rations. The legal profession simply acknowledges that occasionally
a lawyer may engage in dishonest conduct, and that the general mem-
bership of the bar is desirous of alleviating any resulting loss. If such
a scheme is socialistic, surely it is no more so than other cooperative
devices such as legal aid services and workmen's compensation."'
Administration of the California Client Security Fund
The security fund eventually adopted in California has much in
common with funds previously established in other states. The size
of the fund and the manner of its administration must, of course, be
adjusted to the number of the bar's membership and the volume of
complaints which can be anticipated."' However, the salient features
77. Sterling, supra note 62, at 960.
78. See text accompanying notes 92, 95-97 & 102 infra.
79. See Special Committee on Clients' Security Funds, Report, 84 A.B.A. REP.
604, 605 (1959); Sterling, supra note 62; Note, The Disenchanted Client, supra note 71.
80. Sterling, supra note 62.
81. Bar associations with membership much smaller than the California State Bar
may find it sufficient for their purposes to raise a relatively small amount to be ad-
ministered by a board of Security Fund Trustees or by the Board of Governors. Admin-
istrators are given discretion regarding the amounts of reimbursements made, on which
there is no stated maximum except the total of assets available in the fund. Compare
FLA. STAT. ANN, By-Laws under the Integration Rule of the Florida Bar, art. XVII,
§§ 3(d), 6 (Supp. 1973) and MD. ANN. CODE, Rule 1228 (1971), with text ac-
companying notes 83-94 infra.
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of the California plan regarding conditions of payment and to whom
reimbursement will be made are typical.82
With respect both to funding of the project and administration of
complaints, California was fortunate to have an integrated bar with a
large membership as well as a centralized disciplinary structure. Thus
the state bar was able to establish a relatively high ceiling of $25,000
compensation for losses arising from any one transaction,83 without at
the same time having to assess a prohibitive increase in membership
fees."4 Because all attorneys admitted to practice in the state are
members of the state bar, the new security fund avoids the limitations
inherent in those funds applicable only to defalcations of members of
a voluntary association.85
82. See Hunter, supra note 61, at 24-25, briefly outlining typical provisions; in-
cluding subrogation of the fund to the rights of clients receiving payments from the
fund, and a condition that there exist some evidence of dishonest conduct on the part
of the lawyer. See text accompanying notes 95-97 infra.
83. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foll. § 6087, Rule 114D (West Supp. 1972). Al-
though the reimbursement available from various funds is frequently adjusted upward,
a $10,000 limit appears normal (Maryland, New Jersey, North Dakota, Los Angeles
County), with a few states providing $25,000 (New Hampshire) and one state allow-
ing $50,000 (Arizona). A.B.A. STANDING COMMITTEE ON CLIENTS' SECURITY FUND,
MODEL PLAN at 28 n.26 (1970). Most security funds feature such a maximum reim-
bursable amount available to any one client or to compensate for losses caused by any
one lawyer, the total amount to be divided among several claimants. It would seem
that those funds which place no specific limit on reimbursement would provide the least
compensation because of fear of depletion of the fund. See the Standing Committee on
Clients' Security Fund, Report, 96 A.B.A. REP. 595, 597 (1971), for statistics on
assets of various security funds, claims paid and annual contributions made to the fund.
84. The California State Bar has legislative authorization to increase annual
membership fees by ten dollars, to be applied only for purposes of the client security
fund. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6140.5(b) (West Supp. 1972). See also Hersh v.
State Bar, 7 Cal. 3d 241, 496 P.2d 201, 101 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1972).
85. Denying reimbursement to an applicant because the defaulting lawyer is not
a member of the bar association does little for public relations, since the public does
not distinguish between members and non-members in selecting attorneys. In an
eighteen month period between July 1, 1965 and December 31, 1966, twenty-nine New
York lawyers were found to have misappropriated the funds of forty-four different
clients. None of the lawyers involved were members of the New York Bar Association.
Letter from Frederick C. Stimmel, Counsel, New York State Bar Association, to John
W. Bryan, Chairman of the Standing Comm. on Client Security Funds of the ABA,
April 15, 1970. Similarly, in the period between 1950-61, thirty-two members of the
New Jersey State Bar were indicted for defalcations, but only eight of the attorneys were
members of the state bar association. Bryan, Clients' Security Fund Ten Years
Later, 55 A.B.A.J. 757, 758 (1969).
An apparently adequate solution has been found, however, in Delaware and Mary-
land. Although both states have voluntary bar associations, all lawyers must pay an
annual assessment as a condition of practice in these states. Thus, the security funds
have adequate resources to protect all clients in either state. Special Committee on
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The Disciplinary Board, already operating as the central body
within the state-wide disciplinary structure,86 was the convenient choice
for overall administration of the security fund. A Security Fund Com-
mittee, to be appointed by the Board of Governors, will assist the Dis-
ciplinary Board in this additional function.17  Administrative matters
such as receipt of applications for reimbursement and investigation
and hearings relative to the merits of such applications may be dele-
gated to staff attorneys of the state bar and to district committees, the
latter also to be appointed by the Board of Governors. 8 Findings of
fact and recommendations of the district committees are thereafter re-
viewed by the Security Fund Committee.89 The conclusions of both
tht district committees and of the Security Fund Committee are, how-
Clients' Security Fund, Report, 93 A.B.A. REP. 534, 535 (1968). See In the Matter of
a Member of the Bar, 257 A.2d 382 (Del. 1969).
86. See text accompanying notes 53-58 supra.
87. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6140.5(a), foil. § 6087, Rules 112-13 (West Supp.
1972).
88. Id. Rules 106, 110. The three-tiered structure of district committee, Security
Fund Committee and Disciplinary Board obviously parallels the method of investigating
and hearing disciplinary matters. See text accompanying notes 9-10 supra.
Hearings held by district committees are somewhat less formal than those con-
ducted by hearing committees in disciplinary matters. Compare id. Rule 108 (pro-
ceedings regarding applications to the security fund need not be conducted according
to technical rules of evidence; the burden of proof shall be by a preponderance of the
evidence) with id., Rule 29 (in formal disciplinary proceedings legal evidence only may
be received) and Medoff v. State Bar, 71 Cal. 2d 535, 455 P.2d 800, 78 Cal. Rptr.
696 (1969) and Brawner v. State Bar, 48 Cal. 2d 814, 818, 313 P.2d 1, 3-4 (1957), and
cases cited therein (charges of unprofessional conduct must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence). It should also be noted that district committees, the Security
Fund Committee and the Disciplinary Board may have access to State Bar disciplinary
files and records pertaining to alleged losses. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foll. § 6087,
Rule 120 (West Supp. 1972).
Rules of Procedure 111 provides that an attorney shall be given notice and oppor-
tunity to be heard and present evidence regarding alleged losses. Therefore, because
of the overlap in the Disciplinary Board's functions in disciplinary proceedings and se-
curity fund reimbursements, an attorney may be compelled to defend himself against
allegations of dishonest conduct in two proceedings before the board. This raises
problems when security fund proceedings precede disciplinary hearings, and the board
commences the latter hearings after already having found dishonest conduct on the
basis of hearsay and other evidence. The board is placed in the awkward position of
having to "unring the bell": in the second proceeding. This problem was foreseen,
and the board was therefore given discretion to postpone consideration of applications
to the security fund until completion of disciplinary matters or pending court proceed-
ings. Id. Rule 114(B).
89. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foll. § 6087, Rules 110(B), 112 (West Supp. 1972).
The rules provide an abbreviated procedure in the event the staff attorney making the
initial review of an application concludes that a prima facie case for reimbursement
has not been shown. Such negative reports are filed with the Security Fund Commit-
tee and, if approved, constitute rejection of the application. Id. Rule 105(B).
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ever, only advisory. 90 The Disciplinary Board, which receives these
reports, has the final authority to determine whether in fact a reim-
bursable loss has occurred as a result of dishonest conduct, and the
amount of payment to be made.91
Compensation to the defrauded client is conditional upon a find-
ing of a "reimbursable loss," as defined in the state bar rules. The
loss of "money, property or other things of value," occasioned by the
wrongful defalcation, embezzlement or conversion by an active mem-
ber of the state bar, is the general definition of a reimbursable loss.
2
Although the lawyer must have been domiciled in California at the
time of the wrongful act, it is not required that the act itself have
taken place in the state.93 Nor is it necessary that the wrongful act
have occurred as a breach of the lawyer-client relationship in order
that compensation be made. Whether the lawyer was acting as a
lawyer or as a fiduciary, such as executor, trustee, guardian or escrow
holder,94 his client's losses are still reimbursable.
To obtain relief from the fund, an applicant must show that the
lawyer has been disciplined by the bar or was convicted of a crime
based upon the alleged dishonest conduct, or that he has voluntarily
resigned from practice in the state.95 Applicants may also show that
90. Id. Rules 113A, 114A.
91. Id. Rule 114.
92. Id. Rule 103(E)-(G). The definition of "dishonest conduct" given in subdi-
vision F is similar to the language found in the Los Angeles Security Fund Rules and
that of other state security funds. "Fraudulent and dishonest acts . . . including but
not limited to the defalcation or embezzlement of money, wrongful taking of property
. but not including malpractice or negligence" (Los Angeles); "misapplication,
misappropriation or embezzlement" (Washington); "any wrongful act committed by a
practicing attorney against his client, including but not limited to, the defalcation or
embezzlement of money, the wrongful taking of property, or the failure to remit money
or turn over property when due to a client, not including any loss sustained as a re-
sult of any acts of malpractice" (Illinois and West Virginia); "a dishonest act"
(Ohio). ABA STANDING COMMITTEE ON CLIENTS' SECURITY FUND, MODEL PLAN at
28 n.29 (1970).
93. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foil. § 6087, Rule 103(E) (West Supp. 1972).
94. id. Rule 103(G). Coverage in some states is limited to losses arising out of
the attorney-client relationship. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN., Integration Rule of the
Florida Bar, art. xvii, § 2(g) (1972). Such limitations are unsatisfactory, however,
since the public is not liable to recognize the distinction between lawyers functioning
as lawyer and as, for example, executor of an estate, since the latter is a position com-
monly assumed by lawyers. See Bryan, Clients' Security Fund Ten Years Later,
55 A.B.A.J. 757, 759 (1969). The California State Bar chose to follow what ap-
pears to be the trend toward allowing reimbursement for losses arising out of fiduciary
relationships usually associated with the practice of law. See Standing Committee on
Clients' Security Fund, Report, 96 A.B.A. REP. 595, 596 (1971).
95. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foll. § 6087, Rule 103(B)(b) (West Supp. 1972).
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they have reduced their claim for compensation to a civil judgment
against the attorney. 96 The Disciplinary Board has been given flexi-
bility in this area, however, and may find an application to be "an ap-
propriate case" even in the absence of the above evidence.
97
Because the fund was intended to protect individuals, especially
the unwary, who might otherwise suffer great hardship from their law-
yer's thefts, payments are not made to insurers, sureties, bonding com-
panies,98 governmental entities99 or to persons whose losses were cov-
ered by insurance or bond.100 Similarly, the dishonest attorney is pre-
vented from recovering his losses from the fund, either directly or
through his spouse, relatives, partners or any business entity controlled
by any of these persons. 10'
As is the case with most security funds, payments are made only
upon condition that the client makes a pro tanto assignment to the
state bar of his rights against the lawyer involved.' 02 Finally, recov-
ery from the state security fund is precluded for losses arising out of
dishonest conduct which occurred prior to the effective date of the
fund's enactment. 03 However, losses occurring prior to that date may
be reimbursed by the funds still administered by local bar associa-
tions.
1 04
Although the California State Bar cannot boast of being the path-
finder in the field of client security funds, it has sufficient basis for
pride in a fund which is both well structured and adequately funded.
Claims should be handed as expeditiously as possible in fairness to the
client, and to the membership of the state bar. Past experience with
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. Rule 103(G) (4) (b).
99. Id. Rule 103(G) (4) (d).
100. Id. Rule 103 (G) (5).
101. Id. Rule 103 (G)(4)(a), (c).
102. Id. Rule 116. Of course, subrogation of the state bar to the rights of the
client becomes worthless if the client has not secured a civil judgment against the at-
torney and the statute of limitations has expired on the cause of action. It may be
possible, in such cases, for the Disciplinary Board to require the attorney to waive
the statute of limitations as a condition to probation following disciplinary proceed-
ings.
Another problem in this area arises when the supreme court accepts the Disci-
plinary Board's recommendation for probation in a disciplinary case, conditional upon
restitution to the client. If reimbursement is subsequently made to the .lient from the
security fund, the state bar will be subrogated to the rights of the client. The bar will
then be in the position of having to recommend revocation of probation should the at-
torney default in payments to the bar.
103. Id. Rule 103(G)(3).
104. See note 70 supra.
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respect to embezzlements by attorneys indicates that the $25,000 max-
imum compensation should be more than adequate. 1°5
In a profession trained to argue the strict letter of the law as the
standard for others, the California bar has joined other state bars in
voluntarily holding itself to a higher, moral responsibility. 10 6 It is
perhaps too much to expect that the often-expressed skepticism of
lawyer morality will not suddenly be reversed. But the fund is a step
in the right direction toward restoring public confidence, and it is one
worthy of recognition.
Professional Incompetence as a Disciplinable Offense
Dealing with incompetent practitioners is the perennial problem
of any profession committed to high standards. In the history of the
American bar, it has existed at times in critical proportions.'07 Al.
though the system of accreditation of law schools and maintenance of
examination procedures for admission to practice have made the situa-
tion less desparate than in the past, there is continuing criticism that
the bar is not taking adequate measures to protect the public from
careless and ill-trained lawyers.' 08 It was in this spirit that Chief
Justice Burger strongly admonished the bar, and trial lawyers in par-
ticular, to raise standards of professionalism among practitioners. 10 9
In California, Attorney General Younger sponsored a legislative pro-
posal to make incompetency a disciplinable offense." 0  State bars and
the American Bar Association are studying the merits of recognized
specialization as one possible remedy to this problem."'
105. Most losses net out to less than $5,000. Standing Committee on Clients'
Security Fund, Report, 96 A.B.A. REP. 595 (1971).
106. As is typical with most funds, payments are made a matter of grace, for
which the state bar disclaims legal responsibility. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foll.
§ 6087, Rule 115 (West Supp. 1972). Applicants for reimbursement are informed of
this fact on the application form. Id. Rule 104(C).
107. See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 19-20 (1953).
108. See, e.g., M. BLOOM, THE TROUBLE WITH LAWYERS (1968); Tucker, Large
Law Firms and the Canons of Ethics, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 344 (1965).
109. Burger, A Sick Profession?, 5 TULSA L.J. 1 (1968).
110. Senate Bill 58 (1972) would have amended section 6068 of the Business and
Professions Code to include among the duties of an attorney the duty to provide
competent representation. Senate Bill 342 (1972), also sponsored by the Attorney
General, would have added section 6032 to the code, requiring a certified criminal law
specialist in trials of what formerly were capital cases. The state bar opposed both
measures on grounds that they were premature; the bar had a special committee study-
ing the problem of incompetency as a basis for discipline, and a pilot program for
specialization was already underway. Metropolitan News, Aug. 15, 1972, at 1, 7.
111. See Special Committee on Specialization and Specialized Legal Education,
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Gross negligence amounting to habitual disregard of the interests
of a client is already a basis for discipline in California as a violation
of the attorney's oath to discharge his duties to the best of his knowl-
edge and ability.'" z Similarly, conversion of clients' funds or their
commingling with the funds of the attorney,1" 3 knowingly making false
statements to clients" 4 and other intentional acts in disregard of the
interests of clients may constitute moral turpitude, justifying suspen-
sion or disbarment. 15 However, neither the statutes nor the Rules of
Professional Conduct have been construed to apply where the attorney
involved was guilty of ordinary carelessness, lack of adequate prepara-
tion or for simply attempting to handle matters beyond his professional
abilities. 13
6
The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility" 7 offers a rule
Report, 94 A.B.A. REP. 843 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Specialization Committee Re-
port]; Committee on Specialization and Specialized Legal Education, Report, 79 A.B.A.
REP. 582 (1954); Metropolitan News, Aug. 15, 1972, at 7.
112. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6067 (West 1962). "Habitual disregard by
any attorney of the interests of clients is ground for disbarment, even when such neglect
is grossly negligent or careless, rather than willful and dishonest." Demain v. State
Bar, 3 Cal. 3d 381, 387, 375 P.2d 652, 655, 90 Cal. Rptr. 420, 423 (1970).
Although the cases do not expressly state that ordinary negligence is not a basis for
discipline, the factual circumstances involved consistently show intentional or partic-
ularly egregious breaches of duty to the client. See, e.g., Simmons v. State Bar, 2
Cal. 3d 719, 470 P.2d 352, 87 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1970) (disregard of duties to clients
and failure to communicate with them); Grove v. State Bar, 66 Cal. 2d 680, 427 P.2d
164, 58 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1967) (habitual neglect of clients' interests); Clark v. State
Bar, 39 Cal. 2d 161, 246 P.2d 1 (1952) (gross negligence in accounting for guardian-
ship estate, knowingly presenting false account to the court); Copren v. State Bar, 25
Cal. 2d 129, 152 P.2d 729 (1944) (commingling and conversion of clients' funds, ob-
taining funds by false statements, failure to repay loans from clients, failure to render
services for which lawyer was employed); Stephens v. State Bar, 19 Cal. 2d 580, 122
P.2d 549 (1942) (knowingly making false statements to .lients regarding status of
lawsuits, failure to transfer lawsuit within one year after order for change of venue
and complete disregard of disposition of clients' case); Bruns v. State Bar, 18 Cal. 2d
667, 117 P.2d 372 (1941) (failure to render services for which lawyer was employed,
knowingly making false representations to clients regarding status of lawsuit, failure
to maintain proper records while acting as fiduciary); Waterman v. State Bar, 8 Cal. 2d
17, 63 P.2d 1133 (1936) (failure to render services for which lawyer was employed,
advising client not to respond to subpoenas of state bar); Marsh v. State Bar, 210
Cal. 303, 291 P.2d 583 (1930) (gross negligence in failure to file complaint, failure
to appear for trial). See generally Sullivan v- State Bar, 45 Cal. 2d 112, 287 P.2d 778
(1955); Call v. State Bar, 45 Cal. 2d 104, 287 P.2d 761 (1955).
113. See, e.g., Black v. State Bar, 7 Cal. 3d 676, 499 P.2d 968, 103 Cal. Rptr. 288
(1972) and cases cited therein.
114. See, e.g., Copren v. State Bar, 25 Cal. 2d 129, 152 P.2d 729 (1944).
115. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6106 (West 1962).
116. See note 112 supra.
117. SPECIAL CoMMi=rrE ON EVALUATION OF ETmCAL STANDARDS OF THE Aim-
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which would reach considerably farther than the California case law.
Indirectly it could also have a far-reaching impact on methods of legal
practice and preparation of law students. In DR 6-10118 it is stated
that a lawyer shall not handle legal matters "without preparation ade-
quate in the circumstances,""' 9 nor shall he "neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him."' 20  By codifying these two standards, the section
would impose disciplinary sanctions for the same conduct which would
give rise to a cause of action against the lawyer for malpractice. How-
ever, the code also provides a third standard: that a lawyer shall not
"handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not
competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is
competent to handle it.' 2' As noted in the preamble to the code,
this would constitute the minimum level of performance at which law-
yers might practice without incurring disciplinary action.2 2
Enforcement of the Proposed Standards
At the outset it should be noted that difficult evidentiary problems
exist in the enforcement of all three of the proposed minimum stand-
ards. The burden of proof in disciplinary proceedings is by "clear
and convincing" evidence. 123 Lawyers are not obliged to keep records
of research they have performed or the hours they have devoted to a
particular matter. Enforcement of the code provisions regarding ade-
quate preparation and neglect of cases might, therefore, as a practical
matter, be limited to instances of gross negligence. For example, the
state bar may be able to prove neglect or inadequate preparation
where an attorney is charged with failure to file a complaint within
the period allowed by the statute of limitations or failure to note rele-
vant statutes in a brief submitted to the court, but not where the law-
yer is charged with incompetence in conducting a trial or failure to set-
ICAN BAR ASS'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (Final Draft, 1969) [hereinafter
cited as ABA CODE].
118. The ABA Code is divided into Canons containing both Disciplinary Rules
(DR), which are mandatory, and Ethical Considerations (EC) which are aspirational
and "represent the objectives toward which every member of the profession should
strive." Id., Preamble.
Regarding Canon 6, DR 6-101, see Brown, ABA Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity: In Defense of Mediocrity, 16 CATHOLIC LAW. 314, 318-20 (1970); Thode, Canons
6 and 7: The Lawyer-Client Relationship, 48 TEXAS L. REV. 367, 374-78 (1970).
119. ABA CODE, DR 6-101(A) (2).
120. Id., DR 6-101(A) (3).
121. Id., DR 6-101(A)(1).
122. Id, Preamble.
123. See Medoff v. State Bar, 71 Cal. 2d 535, 455 P.2d 800, 78 Cal. Rptr. 696
(1969); Brawner v. State Bar, 48 Cal. 2d 814, 313 P.2d 1 (1957).
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tle a matter prior to trial. 12 4  In these areas where much is left to the
discretion of counsel and in which litigants of malpractice claims have
experienced difficulty even under a lower burden of proof, it is ques-
tionable that DR 6-101 will offer much to strengthen the current dis-
ciplinary standards.
The real impact of DR 6-101 lies in the competency provision.
Its potential targets are not only the general legal practitioner who at-
tempts legal problems requiring special expertise, but also the specialist
who ventures beyond the limits of his usual practice to accept a case
which involves matters with which he has grown unfamiliar. In either
case, the attorney involved could be subject to reproval, suspension- or
disbarment if he knows or should know that he is not competent to
handle the matter without the assistance of another lawyer who is
competent. 125  Since the rule is entitled, "Failing to Act Competently,"
the assumption should be that, even if the lawyer is not competent but
nevertheless successfully concludes the matter, this will be an ade-
quate defense. 26 The code does not state the standard by which it is
determined that an attorney should know that he is not competent in a
particular matter, but at least one commentator has suggested that it
124. Malpractice litigation, for example, involves a balancing of competing in-
terests, the courts giving weight to the consideration that lawyers should not be penalized
for errors of judgment except in regard to fundamental rules of law and mechan-
ical procedural matters. As the California Supreme Court has said: "The attorney is
not liable for every mistake he may make in his practice; he is not, in the absence of an
express agreement, an insurer of the soundness of his opinions or of the validity of
an instrument that he is engaged to draft; and he is not liable for being in error as
to a question of law 6n which reasonable doubt may be entertained by well-informed
lawyers." Lucas v. Kamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 591, 364 P.2d 685, 689, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821,
825 (1961). See Lysick v. Walcom, 258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406 (1968);
Ishmael v. Millington, 241 Cal. App. 2d 520, 59 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1966); Theobald v.
Byers, 193 Cal. App. 2d 147, 13 Cal. Rptr. 864 (1961); Moser v. Western Harness Rac-
ing Ass'n, 89 Cal. App. 2d 1, 200 P.2d 7 (1948).
See generally Green, The Duty to Give Accurate Information, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv.
464 (1965); Isaacs, Liability of the Lawyer for Bad Advice, 24 CALIF. L. REv. 39
(1935-36); Comment, Attorney Malpractice, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 1292 (1963).
125. ABA CODE, DR 6-101 (A) (1). A similar duty to consult other lawyers of
more competence in a given field was found by the district Court of Appeals in Lucas
v. Hamm. "Mhe law today has its specialties, and even as the general practitioner
in medicine must seek the aid of the specialist in his profession, so the general practi-
tioner in law, when faced with a problem beyond his capabilities, must turn to the ex-
pert in his profession to the end that his client is properly served." 11 Cal. Rptr. 727,
731 (1961). The California Supreme Court did not discuss this language in affirming
trial court's finding of nonliability. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821
(1961).
126. See Brown, A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility: In Defense of
Mediocrity, 16 CATHOLIC LAw. 314 (1970).
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ought to be the standard applicable in civil cases, that of the lawyer
of ordinary skill and capacity.
127
The Disciplinary Rule also makes no reference to the attorney's
subjective good faith as a relevant factor. However, the accompany-
ing Ethical Considerations state that if the lawyer expects to become
competent through study and investigation, he may accept employment
in the matter.12 8  This consideration of good faith and due care tem-
pers an otherwise unduly rigid rule and is consonant with the approach
of California courts in disciplinary proceedings.1 29  Although com-
mentary suggests otherwise, 130 the Ethical Considerations should be
consulted in reference to disciplinary action, since they state a higher
standard than the Disciplinary Rules' 3 ' and are expressly offered for
guidance in specific situations.
32
The obvious effect of the competency standard could be to hasten
development of legal specialization. The practice of law in metro-
politan areas is rapidly moving in this direction, even without the
added spur of the Disciplinary Code, although this may not be the case
in rural areas or in less populous states generally. 33  Foreseeably,
an increasing number of law students would be motivated to place par-
ticular emphasis on limited subject areas, and many will be encouraged
to obtain post-graduate training. While this does not necessarily spell
the demise of the general legal practitioner, it could lead to a substan-
tial increase in the cost of legal services. With legal fees already be-
yond the reach of the poor and much of the middle class, the bar
should be well-satisfied that specialization among a large segment of
the profession is prudent before adding the additional pressure of DR
6-101.
Advertising as a Basis for Discipline
Advertising and solicitation13 4 by attorneys has demanded the at-
127. Thode, Canons 6 and 7: The Lawyer-Client Relationship, 48 TExAs L. REv.
367, 374 (1970).
128. ABA CODE, EC 6-3, 6-4.
129. See Sullivan v. State Bar, 45 Cal. 2d 112, 287 P.2d 778 (1955); Call v.
State Bar, 45 Cal. 2d 104, 110, 287 P.2d 761, 765 (1955); cf. Lysick v. Walcom,
258 Cal. App. 2d 136, 149, 65 Cal. Rptr. 406, 414 (1968).
130. Thode, Canons 6 and 7: The Lawyer-Client Relationship, 48 TEXAS L. REv.
367, 374-75 (1970).
131. See note 118 supra.
132. ABA CODE, Preamble.
133. Cf. Brown, A.B.A. Code of Professional Responsibility: In Defense of
Mediocrity, 16 CATHOLIC LAW. 314, 319 (1970).
134. "Advertise: to give notice to, inform or notify, give public notice of, an-
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tention of bar ethics committees more than perhaps any other single
proscribed practice within the profession. 135 Understandably, then,
this area of regulation has generated an appropriate amount of com-
mentary.'3 8 In recent years, however, critics of the basic stricture
have indicated a growing trend of sentiment away from strict regula-
tion in this area.137  In this vein, it has been argued that the current
manner of bar regulation may militate against pressing public inter-
ests13S and operate unfairly against segments of the bar.
139
nounce publicly, notice or observe." BLACK'S LAw DIcTioNARY 74 (4th ed. rev. 1968).
"Solicit: to appeal for something; to ask earnestly; to ask for the purpose of receiving."
Id. at 1564. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 6150-54 (West 1962) (making solici-
tation a misdemeanor when conducted through runners and cappers). Advertising,
considered to be a less odious method of solicitation, is prohibited by Rule 2 of the
Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. foll. § 6076, Rule 2. Advertising generally is also
regulated by Rules 2a, 10, 18, 20-21. See text accompanying notes 149-51 infra.
See generally H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETIcs 210-73 (1953); Note Advertising, Solici-
tation and Legal Ethics, 7 VAND. L. REv. 677 (1954).
135. Commentary on this subject points out that fully one-third of the opinions of
the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics concern advertising and solicitation. See
Shuchman, Ethics and Legal Ethics: The Propriety of the Canons as a Group Moral
Code, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 244, 245 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Shuchman]; Com-
ment, Controlling Lawyers by Bar Associations and Courts, 5 HARv. Civ. R.-Csv.
Lim. L. REv. 301, 351 (1970). A glance at the opinions of the Committee of Le-
gal Ethics, Los Angeles County Bar Association, reveals a similar devotion of the
committee's attention to this area. See Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR Ass'N, ETIcs
OPINIONS (1968) [hereinafter cited as ETHics OPINIONS].
136. General treatment of this subject matter is presented in the following articles.
Smith, Canon 2: "A Lawyer Should Assist the Legal Profession in Fulfilling Its Duty
to Make Legal Counsel Available," 48 ThxAs L. REv. 285 (1970); Zimroth, Group Legal
Services and the Constitution, 76 YALE L.J. 966 (1967); Comment, Controlling Lawyers
By Bar Associations and Courts, 5 HARv. Crv. R.-Civ. Lm. L. REv. 301 (1970);
Note, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U. Cm. L. REV.
674 (1958); Note, Advertising, Solicitation and Legal Ethics, 7 VAND. L. REv. 677
(1954).
137. See, e.g., J. CAR.iN, LAwYERs' ETHics: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK
Crry BAR 160-61 (1966); Shuchman, supra note 135; Comment, Controlling Lawyers
By Bar Associations and Courts, 5 HIv_ Crv. R.-Crv. LmB. L. REV. 301, 309 (1970).
138. Because restrictions on advertising forbid direct as well as indirect advertis-
ing, attorneys may be dissuaded from appearing in public forums designed to educate
the public in the legal processes. See text accompanying notes 156-57 infra. Such reg-
ulations generally may prevent lower and middle income groups from becoming ac-
quainted with their rights, and have, until recently, prevented the growth of group le-
gal services. See Group Legal Services, 34 CAL. ST. B.J. 318 (1959) [hereinafter cited
as Group Legal Services]; Brown, Law Offices for Middle Income Clients, 40 CAL. ST.
B.J 720 (1965); Zimroth, Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76 YALE L.J 966
(1967).
139. Whatever justification may exist for maintaining restrictions on advertising,
the fact remains that the impact of such regulations is largely confined to the sole
practitioner representing small business concerns and clients from lower and middle in-
come groups. Attorneys employed by large, established law firms have no need for
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At its earliest inception, the bar's restriction on advertising was a
logical extension of the common law crimes of champerty, maintenance
and barratry,"4 O the historical forebearers of the rule against solicita-
tion. Advertising was prohibited as a similar, though less egregious,
breach of decorum, which tended to promote oppressive and vexatious
litigation. 4' Perhaps more to the point, advertising was considered
to be unfitting for a dignified professional to whom public service was
foremost and the gaining of livelihood was incidental.
142
Although modern justifications for the rules against advertising
continue to place greatest emphasis on the tendency of advertising
practices to commercialize the profession and thereby lessen its tradi-
tional sense of dignity,' 43 there is also apprehension that advertising,
the usual forms of advertising, since their clients tend to be familiar with legal prob-
lems and are able to pay for expensive representation. See J. CARLIN, LAMYERS'
ETHics: A SURVEY OF THE NEW YORK CITY BAR 119-29 (1966). Attorneys in
this latter category, however, frequently employ more subtle forms of advertising,
such as use of social clubs and entertainment of clients, which feature the same mo-
tive and function as the more visible methods which are punished. C. WYZANSKI,
WHEREAS-A JUDGE'S PREMISES 234-35 (1965). See H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHIcS 218
(1953); ETHics OPINIONS, supra note 135, at 353. See in re Cohn, 10 Ill. 2d 186,
196, 139 N.E.2d 301, 306 (1956) (Bristow, J., concurring), noting the irreconcilia-
bility of the rules against solicitation with the condoned practice of gaining clients at
country clubs.
The impact of advertising restrictions on the First Amendment rights of lawyers is
beyond the scope of this article. However, this timely issue has been thoroughly ex-
plored in recent commentary. See Comment, Controlling Lawyers by Bar Associations
and Courts, 5 HARV. Civ. R.-Civ. LIB. L. REV. 301 (1968); Comment, Advertising,
Solicitations and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J.
1181, 1185-91 (1972). See also Zimroth, Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76
YALE L.J. 966 (1967).
140. Champerty consists of an agreement to bear the cost of litigating the claim
of another in consideration for a share of the proceeds. The speculative nature of
such a bargain was considered to be immoral, as trading in pain and suffering of oth-
ers.
Maintenance consists in assisting another, with money or advice, in litigating a
claim in which the offender has no interest.
Barratry is the offense of frequently committing champerty or maintenance, stirring
up lawsuits or quarrels generally. See Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF.
L. REV. 48 (1935); Zimroth, Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76 YALE L.J.
966, 969-71 (1967).
141. Zimroth, Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76 YALE L.J. 966,
969-71 (1967).
142. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICs 210-12 (1953).
143. See, e.g., Mayer v. State Bar, 2 Cal. 2d 71, 39 P.2d 206 (1934). "If the
respect of the people in the honor and integrity of the legal profession is to be re-
tained, both lawyers and laymen must recognize and realize the fact that the legal pro-
fession is a profession and not a trade . . . . It is not a business, using bargain
counter methods to reap large profits for those who conduct it." Id. at 74, 39 P.2d
at 208. "[W]e do not believe that the profession of law is, or ought to be, merely a
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if left unbridled, will create an atmosphere in which solicitation and
general unethical conduct will thrive. Thus, the attendant conse-
quences of advertising are described as including obstruction of justice
resulting from increased litigation and congestion of court calendars; 144
breach of the attorney's duty to his client by overreaching, 145 over-
charging and underrepresentation; 4 6 unethical practices such as asser-
tion of fraudulent claims, corruption of public officials and subornation
of perjury, and detriment to the public image of the profession' 47 as
well as loss of a high-minded sense of professionalism. Also foreseen,
perhaps most realistically, is the problem of deceptive advertising and
'highly competitive business.' And because it is not, and because it is necessary that
the public should not be given the idea that it is so considered by the members of the
profession, the rule against solicitation of business by advertisement is a reasonable
regulation." Barton v. State Bar, 209 Cal. 677, 683, 289 P. 818, 820 (1930). See
also Pitts, Group Legal Services: A Plan to Huckster Professional Services, 55
A.B.AJ. 633 (1969); Note, Group Legal Services, 79 HARV. L. REV. 416, 422 (1965).
The attitudes expressed in the quotations above contrast sharply with the practice
of maintaining "treaties" between the state bar and various commercial institutions
and industries, assuring the legal profession of non-competition in certain areas of
the legal "market." Such arrangements have been made between the state bar and the
California Bankers Association, the California Land Title Association, automobile as-
sociations and associations of insurance companies and adjusters. See Group Legal
Services, supra note 138, at 333-34 (1959). See generally Greenwood, The Elements
of Professionalization, in PROFESSIONALIZATION 12-13 (H. Vollmer & D. Mills eds.
1966); Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles, and Poultices-and Cures?, 5 L. & CONTEMP.
PRon. 104 (1938); Riesman, Some Observations on Law and Psychology, 19 U. Cm. L
REv. 30, 34 (1951).
144. See Luther, Legal Ethics: The Problem of Solicitation, 44 A.B.A.J. 554
(1958). "[lit is properly said that prevention of controversy and litigation will im-
prove the social order. It lessens instances in which the lay public may feel that a per-
son's honest intentions and desires have been frustrated by what the layman
chooses to call 'technicalities' of the law." ETHmcs OPINIONS, supra note 135, at 240.
It can no longer be contended that litigation of colorable claims is contrary to the
public interest. Several recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court have illus-
trated that actions which in the absence of solicitation might never have been brought
can serve to advance important social goals. United Mine Workers v. Illinois Bar
Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia
State Bar Ass'n, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
145. The typical example of overreaching features the lawyer pressuring the
dazed and semi-conscious accident victim into signing a contingency fee contract for
any further lawsuit concerning the accident. Such practices are, of course, proscribed
by rules against solicitation. See Zimroth, Group Legal Services ;and the Constitution,
76 YALE L.J. 966, 977-78 (1967), illustrating that even "ambulaAce chasing" should
be judged after reference to the circumstances rather than according to a general
proscription.
146. Luther, Legal Ethics: The Problem of Solicitation, 44 A.B.A.J. 554, 555
(1958); contra Note, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25
U. Cm. L. REv. 674, 684 (1958) (pointing out that solicitation alone does not in-
crease the likelihood that a lawyer will be overly anxious to settle).
147. Barton v. State Bar, 209 Cal. 677, 289 P. 818 (1930); see note 143 supra.
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the possibility that lay persons would select lawyers on the basis of ads
rather than according to relative capability.
148
California Restrictions on Advertising
In California, restrictions against solicitation of professional em-
ployment are delineated in Rules 2 and 2a of the Rules of Professional
Conduct.'49 Advertising practices are limited indirectly by Rules 10
and 18.150 Rule 2 states the strict tenet that members of the State
Bar "shall not solicit . . . by advertising or otherwise," illustrating this
by reference to such practices as volunteering counsel, use of any
broadcast or printed media to advertise one's professional status and
efforts to attract publicity by rendering favors to representatives of the
media.' Concessions from this proscription are few and narrowly
drawn. To other lawyers and to clients an attorney may distribute
notices of newly formed partnerships, change of address and other
marginally commercial matters. 1 2  In addition, a veteran is permitted
to advertise his resumption of the practices of law.153  Attorneys may
advertise their professional status and place of business to the general
148. Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 522, 255 P.2d 508, 519 (1950)
(Traynor, J., dissenting); State v. Nichols, 151 So. 2d 257, 260 (Fla. 1963); Jackson-
ville Bar Ass'n v. Wilson, 102 So. 2d 292, 294-95 (Fla. 1958). Justice Traynor's
dissent in Hildebrand notes that clients who are inexperienced in selecting counsel may
be induced by advertising to select unsuitable counsel. However, this observation ignores
the obvious; inexperienced clients have difficulty in selecting counsel even in the ab-
sence of advertising.
Judicial decisions have, in several situations, found the policy against solicitation
to be outweighed by competing social interests. See, e.g., Magida v. Continental Can
Co., 231 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied 351 U.S. 972 (1956) (solicitation of
shareholders to join in shareholders' action); In re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467 (D- Md. 1934)
(solicitation necessary to obtain enough clients for filing of bankruptcy proceeding, aid-
ing client in collection of a debt); Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Ass'n, 191 Ga. 366, 381, 12
S.E.2d 602, 610 (1940) (solicitation by local bar for claims against usurious fi-
nance companies).
149. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foll. § 6076, Rules 2, 2a (West Supp. 1972).
150. "A member of the State Bar shall not advise the commencement, prosecu-
tion or defense of a case, unless he has been consulted in reference thereto, except when
his relation to a party or to the subject matter is such as to make it proper for him
to do so." Id. Rule 10 (West 1962).
"A member of the State Bar shall not advise inquiries or render opinions to
them through or in connection with a newspaper, radio or other publicity medium of
any kind in respect to their specific legal problems, whether or not such attorney
shall be compensated for his services." Id. Rule 18.
Rules 10 and 18 are particularly relevant to regulation of "indirect" advertising.
See text accompanying notes 158-74 infra.
151. Id. Rule 2 (West Supp. 1972); see ABA CODE, supra note 117, at DR 2-101.
152. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foll. § 6076, Rule 2 (West Supp. 1972).
153. Id. Rule 2a.
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public only by means of telephone directories, recognized law lists and
customary use of business cards.' 54 Rules 20 and 21 also provide a
narrow relaxation of the prohibition for the advertising of group legal
services and free legal aid offices.155
The prohibition of Rule 2 was recently applied in Millsberg v.
State Bar.156 In that decision, the California Supreme Court publicly
reproved an attorney for permitting the advertising of his professional
skills by an association of rental owners. Although the attorney was
employed by the association and was involved in a wide range of ac-
tivities for the association, it was held that the manner in which such
activities were advertised in the association's magazine was pro-
scribed by Rule 2. The attorney had wilfully violated the rule by per-
mitting the use of his name and profession in a manner calculated to
attract new members to the association.1
57
The outer parameters of what appears above to be a rather
straightforward prohibition have been obscured, however, in the area
of indirect advertising.5. 8  Often, as a result of their role in society,
lawyers have attracted public attention by activities which may or may
not have been commercially motivated. 59 In order to prevent attor-
154. Id. Rule 2; see ABA CODE, supra note 117, at DR 2-102.
155. Rule 20 provides that the furnishing of group legal services is not in itself a
violation of the rules against solicitation, subject to the condition, inter alia, that attor-
neys rendering such services be identified only in response to individual inquiries. Sim-
ilar qualifications are stated in Rule 21 with respect to participation by attorneys in legal
aid offices and the publicity thereof. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE foil. § 6076, Rules
20, 21 (West Supp. 1972). Compare ABA CODE, supra note 117, at DR 2-103(D),
DR 2-104(A)(2). See Blakslee, Legal Aid Offices and Advertising, 53 A.B.AJ.
1148 (1967).
156. 6 Cal. 3d 65, 490 P.2d 543, 98 Cal. Rptr. 223 (1972).
157. Id. at 75, 490 P.2d at 549, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
158. The American Bar Association's Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 27,
originally made the distinction between direct and indirect advertising as follows:
"Indirect advertisement for business by furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments
concerning causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged, or concerning the man-
ner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the importance of the law-
yer's positions, and all other like self-laudation, defy the traditions and lower the tone of
our high calling, and are intolerable." ABA, CANONS OF PRO.SSIONAL ETMICS No.
27, quoted in Opinions on Professional Ethics; see ETHiCS OPINIONS, supra note 135,
at 438-40.
159. Although the question of whether publicity is unethically obtained is an-
swered largely by reference to the lawyer's good faith, certain conduct having the
effect of advertising is proscribed because of the impact such conduct might have on the
public's attitude toward the bar. Compare Ethics Opinion No. 1967-12, 43 CAL. ST.
B.J. 52, 55 (1968) and ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 285
(1967) (emphasizing good faith) with ETmcs OPINIONS, supra note 135, at 239-42,
450-53 and Informal Decision No. C-230(g), ABA Committee on Professional Ethics
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neys from subverting the rules against advertising by indirection, the
various bar association ethics committees have sought to regulate these
subtle forms of attracting clients.
Thus, committee opinions have circumscribed the manner and de-
gree to which members of the bar may participate in radio and televi-
sion broadcasts,1 60 and in public appearances as lecturers and panel-
ists.' 0 ' Efforts have also been made to limit news and feature stories
about members of the bar. 62  The bar has also deemed it improper
for lawyers to publish books relating to their professional experi-
ences 16 and has admonished its members regarding self-laudation in
newspaper articles'64 and publications in nonlegal periodicals. 65
Although these activities appear to involve no more than what
would be expected from persons active in public affairs, the bar has,
nevertheless, for many years regarded this conduct as a covert man-
ner of self-advertising potentially injurious to the dignity of the profes-
sion. Even seemingly innocuous forms of stating that a named indi-
vidual is an attorney may therefore be examined to determine whether
the public could construe the statement as an attempt to obtain pub-
licity and whether the attorney's motivation was to derive some degree
of advertising.166
Because of the multiplicity of factual circumstances which may
garner some degree of publicity for an attorney, it is difficult to formu-
late precise standards which are applicable to all cases.' 6 7  Lack of
certitude is further compounded by the abstract nature of the interest
that the bar seeks to protect. The question of when conduct may be
regarded as overly commercial and thus lowering the tone and tradi-
tional dignity of the bar is necessarily a matter of degree.'
68
and Grievances, 42 L.A.B. BULL. 223, 224 (1961) (emphasizing circumstances and
effect on the general public).
160. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 298 (1967); ETICS
OPINIONS, supra note 135, at 239-42, 450-53; Ethics Opinion No. 1969-17, 44 CAL. ST.
B.J. 202 (1969).
161. ETHICS OPINIONS, supra note 135, at 196-200, 293-94, 418-22.
162. See State v. Nichols, 151 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 1963); In re Connelly, 18 App.
Div. 2d 466, 240 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1963). See generally Note, Indirect Advertising: News-
paper and Magazine Articles, 50 CORN. L. REV. 95 (1964).
163. ETHICS OPINIONS, supra note 135, at 422-25.
164. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, Nos. 43, 270, 432, 854
(1967); ETHICS OPINIONS, supra note 135, at 222-24.
165. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, Nos. 162, 273 (1967);
ETHICS OPINIONS, supra note 135, at 179-81, 231-32, 260-61.
166. See ETHICS OPINIONS, supra note 135, at 293-94, 418-22.
167. ETHICS OPINIONS, supra note 135, at 418-22, 450-53; see In re Connelly, 18
App. Div. 2d 466, 240 N.Y.S.2d 126 (1963).
168. See, e.g., ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, Informal Opinion No. 884
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The criteria which are applied to determine whether publicity is
actually advertising in the sense proscribed by Rule 2 are equally in-
definite. Advising the practitioner that his public activities may be
judged, variously, by his own subjective motives or by how his activi-
ties could be construed by the public' 69 or perhaps by the evaluation by
the ethics committee of the nature of the program on which the law-
yer is to appear,170 may offer too little in the way of guidance.
It is suggested that the pervasive nature of bar regulation in the
area of advertising, 171 together with the lack of consistency in commit-
tee rulings on the subject, 172 may inhibit members of the bar from ac-
(1967) (finding the phrase "A Lawyer's Time and Advice are his Stock in Trade-Abe
Lincoln" printed at the bottom of lawyer's statement forms was unduly commercial,
and constituted self-laudation); id. Informal Opinion No. 747 (A lawyer may not wear
jewelry bearing the insignia of his state bar association, thus indicating that he is a
member-lawyer of the association). See generally Note, Ethics, 1 SAN DIEoO L REv.
130, 132 (1964).
169. See note 159 supra.
170. See, e.g., Informal Decision C-230(g), supra note 159. Although the ABA
had previously condemned participation by attorneys and judges on commercially
sponsored television and radio broadcasts, Decision C-230(g) made an exception for
Meet the Press; in the opinion of the committee, the program was "of a distinctly pub-
lic service type," despite its commercial sponsorship. The general rule as stated by
the ABA is "public information programs, such as the panel or interview types, sponsored
by bar associations . . . or those non-commercial programs of this type" are proper
for participation by lawyers and judges, "provided, always, that such programs con-
form to the proper standards of the bench and bar." ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL
ETcs, OPINIONs, No. 298 (1961). "[A] combination of the professional and the com-
mercial in the same program inevitably detracts from the dignity of the legal profes-
sion." Id. No. 186 (1951). Commercial sponsorship permits the inference that
participating lawyers are both assisting the sponsor and seeking employment from the
audience. Id. No. 286 (1965).
ABA CODE, supra note 117, at EC 2-2 (lawyers "acting under proper auspices"
and motivated by public spirit should participate in educational programs concerning
legal issues).
Some ethics opinions suggest that when programs are sponsored by a local bar as-
sociation, rather than by a commercial sponsor, the predominant impression will be that
the bar is desirous of performing a public service only, and that attorneys involved
are interested solely in informing the public. See ABA CoMm. ON PROFESSIONAL
ETcs, OPINIoNs, No. 298 (1967); ETmcs OPINIONS, supra note 135, at 239-42.
171. The scope of bar regulation is described as follows: "Perhaps in no phase of
its self-discipline is the Bar of this state, and of the country in general, more careful,
circumspect and exacting than in its strict avoidance of any act or conduct which bor-
ders on advertising." ETHICS OPINIONs, supra note 135, at 215.
172. For example, the ethics committee of a local bar association ruled that an at-
torney addressing a non-profit organization on general legal issues could give his
name and profession, but not a personal biographical sketch. ETHICS OPINIONS, supra
note 135, at 418-22. However, the same committee had, nine years earlier, also ruled
that a lawyer addressing a property owners' association might properly detail his own
trial experience as well as give emphasis to the fact that he specialized in the area of
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tively taking part in matters of community interest. Of course, a prac-
tioner may seek an advisory opinion from his local bar's ethics commit-
tee prior to addressing a citizens group or appearing on a radio broad-
cast to discuss consumer rights or constitutional questions. It is likely,
however, that many lawyers will be dissuaded from taking the initia-
tive in such activities. The dissenting opinions in Millsberg suggests
that rather than encouraging attorneys to be simply more circumspect
in their public appearances, the bar may be dampening the enthusiasm
of its members to carry out their responsibilities in the area of pro bono
publico activities. 173  An attorney can hardly be criticized if, upon
consideration of the indefinite standards by which his conduct will be
judged, he declines to make appearances which may subject him to
censure. It may be asked whether this result does not also diminish the
prestige of the professionY.
4
Obviously, there are important and somewhat conflicting interests
involved in this area of professional regulation. Increasing public in-
terest in the law and how it is administered as well as increasing ex-
amination by the mass media of all manner of public and private ac-
tivities which were not the subject of much public interest in the past,
may in time result in the profession taking a different view of limita-
tions on advertising.
Conclusion
The state bar of California has proven its determination to main-
tain effective self-discipline among its membership. The continuing
contribution of time and funds is, of course, no more than the price or
the privilege of self-regulation. There is no assurance that control of
lawyer discipline will be left in the hands of lawyers unless the public
discussion, provided the attorney had no intention to advertise himself. Id. at 196-
200. On the other hand, it had also ruled that good faith subjective intent on the part
of the attorney does not prevent conduct from constituting "advertising" as prohibited
by Rule 2 of the Rules of Professional conduct. Id. at 214-16, 239-42, 422-25. But cf.
H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS, 218-19 (1953).
173. Millsberg v. State Bar, 6 Cal. 3d 65, 77, 490 P.2d 543, 550, 98 Cal. Rptr.
223 (1971) (Mosk, J., dissenting). For example, when the television program The
Advocates was aired, the show's lawyer-moderator, Roger Fisher, received a critical
letter from the president of a local bar association, suggesting that Fisher's appearances
might constitute advertising as well as improper appearances in the media in a theatri-
cal role as a lawyer. Fisher, Lawyers, Television and Public Affairs, 53 Cm. B.R.
250, 257 (1972).
174. See Note, Ethics, 1 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 130 (1964), describing resulting public-
ity attending disciplinary proceedings on charges of advertising by a prominent New
York law firm.
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is satisfied that adequate measures are being taken. Unfortunately,
the general public seems largely unaware of the progress which has
been achieved in this area.
Reporting to the public is, however, not the only task left un-
finished. There remains the need for continual input regarding the
disciplinary standards and the manner of their enforcement. This is
especially necessary with respect to those rules which affect nonprofes-
sional activities or which have an impact on the role of the organized
bar in the community. Standards of professionalism such as those re-
stricting advertising or regulating competency require careful and per-
sistent consideration. Evaluation of these rules in the context of com-
peting interests may warrant a reorientation by the state bar.

